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OPEN LETTER ON ETHICAL NORMS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP
1
 
 
Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai  
 
As intellectual property (“IP”) scholars, we write this letter with 
aspirations of reaching the highest ethical norms possible for our field. 
Changes in the field of IP make it incumbent upon us to look inward, 
examine our current practices, and begin to frame norms that we hope 
can apply across the field of legal academia.  
We have noted an influx of large contributions from corporate 
and private actors who have an economic stake in ongoing policy de-
bates in the field. Research funding has increased as IP issues have 
become more salient in both the political and business realms.  And it 
has coincided with a decline in university funding for basic academic 
research. Some dollars come with strings attached, such as the ability 
to see or approve academic work prior to publication or limitations on 
the release of data. Some dollars simply arrive as donations to IP pro-
grams or centers, or in the form of travel grants and other attractive 
gifts. 
At the same time, IP scholars have become more engaged in poli-
cy advocacy, the writing of amicus briefs, and the practice of law. In 
general, we think this is a salutary development. Courts regularly 
complain about scholarship being unconnected to the real world,
2
 and 
law students worry that they are not being trained to succeed in prac-
tice.
3
 Greater engagement between scholars and the world of practice 
can help solve both problems and can also bring a thoughtful, more 
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unbiased perspective to legislative and judicial debates traditionally 
dominated by interested parties. At the same time, however, IP schol-
ars who are also engaged in practice or advocacy must struggle to 
keep their academic and advocacy roles separate. 
We cannot imagine that any academic believes that his or her 
judgment is subject to purchase. Nevertheless, the flow of dollars can 
have an insidious effect on values scholars hold dear in academia. We 
have seen evidence in other fields that researchers who receive gifts 
and support can have an uncanny tendency to find results that would 
please their benefactors.
4
 One must be mindful of the delicate pull of 
friends with money.  
Funding can have other subtle effects on academic discourse. In 
the highest tradition of academic inquiry, scholars should strive to be 
open to the comments, suggestions, and views of others — learning 
from colleagues in the field and modifying their inclinations as they 
hear persuasive arguments. As a community, scholars benefit from 
constant effort to shape and improve each other’s thinking, and such 
effort makes the entire field intellectually stronger and more valuable. 
We worry that an influx of money paid to those who take certain posi-
tions can cause people to become locked into those positions rather 
than being open to academic discussion and allowing one’s perspec-
tive to evolve as part of that discourse. In the long term, the influx of 
money has the potential to create polarization in the field, creating a 
situation in which different sides speak only to those with similar per-
spectives. Such a result could seriously weaken the potential for 
scholars to strengthen their work by subjecting it to critique and tak-
ing seriously the scrutiny it receives. 
Finally, we are mindful of the need to protect the role of the aca-
demic as a trusted source of reliable information for policymakers and 
society at large. The issues described above run the risk of creating 
the impression in the minds of the public that academics are lobbyists 
rather than scholars — with the accompanying loss of trust. 
We do not intend to be critical of any individual academic or the 
field as a whole. It would be improper to criticize scholars for violat-
ing ethical norms when no such norms exist across legal academia. 
Rather, our goal is to bring attention to the dramatic changes that are 
occurring in the field, highlight potential pitfalls, and suggest a set of 
ethical norms to which we will strive to adhere.  
IP law is not the first field to encounter these problems. In fact, 
legal academics are well behind the curve in grappling with the impli-
cation of these issues and establishing uniform guidelines. Studies of 
research in the field of medicine have long identified concerns about 
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the connection between sponsorship and results.
5
 For example, a 2003 
study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) 
concluded that “industry-sponsored research tends to draw pro-
industry conclusions.”
6
 In a meta-analysis
7
 of eight articles addressing 
the issue of industry-sponsored research, which together had them-
selves covered more than eleven hundred original medical research 
studies, Bekelman et al. found that industry-sponsored trials were 3.6 
times more likely to reach conclusions favorable to industry than 
those without industry sponsorship.
8
 In addition to more positive out-
comes, the articles also raised concerns about subtle judgment issues 
in the design of the sponsored medical trials that could influence re-
sults.
9
 
Direct sponsorship of research is not the only cause of concern. 
Studies have concluded that other types of financial ties besides direct 
sponsorship can have an effect on results. For example, a 1998 study 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine examined sixty-
nine articles related to a particular type of pharmaceutical.
10
 The study 
showed that authors whose research supported the use of the pharma-
ceutical were significantly more likely to have financial relationships 
with the manufacturers than those who were neutral or critical.
11
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As concerns have increased about financial ties outside of direct 
sponsorship of research, studies have increasingly focused on unveil-
ing additional financial conflicts of interests that subtly influence phy-
sician practice. For example, a recent analysis by Robertson et al. 
summarized several studies on the effects of pharmaceutical industry 
gifts in the form of paid travel and accommodation, food and bever-
ages, sponsorship for continuing medical education, as well as free 
tickets to cultural and sporting events.
12
 Robertson et al. tracked 
changes in prescribing behavior after physicians received such bene-
fits.  Notably, physicians who received money for continuing medical 
education insisted that such funding would not influence their medical 
practice.
13
 Despite this conviction, post-sponsorship prescribing pat-
terns shifted toward endorsement of the sponsoring pharmaceutical 
brands.
14
 
Concerned that public trust in medical research could be seriously 
eroded,
15
 the medical research field has engaged in reviews of its own 
policies that have led to revisions of various ethical rules. Many, alt-
hough not all, highly respected medical journals now require authors 
to submit extensive financial contribution reports along with their ar-
ticles.
16
 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(“PhRMA”), which represents biopharmaceutical research companies, 
introduced a Code of Ethics designed to limit the pharmaceutical-
physician relationship.
17
 Moreover, the Affordable Care Act (2010), 
in order to increase transparency, requires pharmaceutical companies 
to report financial gifts to physicians, even low-value purchases, such 
as lunch.
18
 ProPublica, a public interest, investigative journalism non-
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profit, compiles and publishes this data on its website.
19
 In general, 
academics in the medical field have organized policies and imple-
mented standards that aim to preserve the academy’s integrity, objec-
tivity, and ultimately, its ability to convey important findings. 
Objectivity is a general scholarly goal that applies throughout all 
fields of research, even beyond pharmaceuticals. A 2015 New York 
Times article described controversy surrounding Coca-Cola’s work 
with scientists to promote the conclusion that solutions to the nation’s 
obesity problem should focus on exercise, rather than reducing caloric 
intake.
20
 The press report noted that the company, which would bene-
fit considerably from any shift away from efforts to reduce consump-
tion of sugary drinks, had partnered with respected scientists to 
promote this message through medical journals, conferences, and so-
cial media, including funding a nonprofit organization to advance the 
campaign.
21
 In the field of economics, a British study examined the 
financial affiliations of prominent academic financial economists who 
were associated with groups proposing financial reforms in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis.
22
 The study found that while the academic 
economists frequently had private affiliations with the potential to 
raise conflicts of interest issues, the economists disclosed those affil-
iations infrequently and inconsistently.
23
 Similarly, in September 
2015, the New York Times published an article describing troubling 
ties between academics and industry on both sides of the debate con-
cerning genetically modified crops.
24
 The article described corpora-
tions providing what it termed “special ‘unrestricted grants’” to 
academics.
25
 It also suggested that companies had paid for academics 
to make lobbying trips to Capitol Hill and had published articles under 
the names of prominent academics — articles that were, in some cas-
es, drafted by industry consultants rather than the scholars.
26
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In the fields of scientific and medical research, journals and gov-
ernment funding sources can serve as important gatekeepers and ref-
erees. A peer-reviewed medical journal could, in theory, reject an arti-
article if there is reason to believe that the work is compromised by 
financial interests. Even asking about financial interests can lead to a 
check on behavior. Thus, if journals require authors to disclose gifts 
or financial ties above a certain amount, researchers may be moved to 
reject anything above that amount in anticipation of having to answer 
the question at the publication gate. Such gatekeepers can also impose 
transparency by requiring authors to disclose information in a way 
that is accessible and useful.
27
 Questions and requirements from gov-
ernment funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”) and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), can have sim-
ilar effects. Finally, the peer-review process encourages authors to 
tone down unsupported claims
28
 and has the potential to tease out 
methodological concerns. Although serious criticism and debate re-
main over the effectiveness of these ethical rules, peer review supplies 
both a mechanism to implement the rules and an awareness of their 
importance. 
In contrast to medical research, legal research lags well behind, 
both in terms of the establishment of ethical codes and methods of 
enforcing those codes. The overwhelming majority of legal journals 
are not peer-reviewed.
29
 Rather, the articles are chosen and edited by 
law students whose knowledge of methodological flaws and potential 
biases may be limited. Law journals generally do not request infor-
mation on conflicts of interest and do not require disclosure of such 
information. Similarly, the legal field lacks organizations, such as the 
NIH and NSF, that have either the purse strings or the bully pulpit to 
impose meaningful ethical rules. Legal authors may occasionally seek 
federal funds to support research, but that is far from the norm. As a 
result, it is unsurprising that behavioral norms similar to those in the 
scientific fields have yet to emerge. 
In some corners, however, conflict of interest rules are beginning 
to have an impact on the legal academy. Consider Harvard Universi-
ty’s policy, which was promulgated in response to concern over po-
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tential conflicts of interest at the medical school
30
 and applies broadly 
to all Harvard academics, including legal academics.
31
 It “requires 
public disclosure of all relevant faculty financial interests; prohibits 
most gifts from industry; regulates faculty members’ participation in 
industry speakers’ bureaus; and restricts industry involvement in con-
tinuing medical education.”
32
 This type of conflict of interest policy 
could serve as a model for legal academia and offers a good starting 
point for thinking about the issues as they arise in the legal context. 
The bias that may result from a financial conflict of interest is, of 
course, not the only bias that can affect either legal or scientific re-
sults. The pressure to produce publishable results, to say something of 
significance that will garner attention, to reevaluate the accepted 
norm, or to otherwise approach the data in a way that will lead toward 
certain conclusions, can affect any inquiry.
33
 Moreover, few scholars 
would argue that we are ever able to operate in the realm of perfect 
objectivity — whether as legal academics or scientists.
34
 Neverthe-
less, striving for the greatest objectivity possible is a worthwhile goal, 
and creating the transparency that will allow other academic col-
leagues to press us toward objectivity is essential to that end.
35
 With 
this in mind, we believe that we can borrow from the experience of 
medical science to begin building a set of cultural and ethical norms 
for IP scholars. 
In addition to transparency about financial conflicts of interest, 
the medical and life science communities have also had to confront 
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squarely the issue of data disclosure. As these fields have recognized, 
and as the broader scientific community has long understood, disclo-
sure of the data necessary to replicate a particular research result is 
important protection against spurious claims.
36
 In recent years, inde-
pendent investigators who were given the opportunity to access and 
reanalyze data underlying published results of clinical trials have chal-
lenged many of those results as invalid or incomplete.
37
 Citing these 
independent studies, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) recently rec-
ommended a norm of expeditious sharing of all clinical trial data nec-
essary to support results in a publication.
38
 While the IOM 
recommendation focuses on clinical scientists, a 2003 report by the 
National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) stresses the obligations of all 
life scientists to make freely available “the data, algorithms, or other 
information that is central or integral to the publication — that is, 
whatever is necessary to support the major claims of the paper and 
would enable one skilled in the art to verify or replicate the claims.”
39
 
Additionally, according to the NAS, authors should provide data “in a 
form on which other scientists can build with further research.”
40
 
Since 2003, NIH has required researchers applying for more than 
$500,000 in funding to submit a plan for data sharing.
41
 
As for the social sciences, in 1995, prominent political scientist 
Gary King enunciated a “replication standard.”
42
 Under this standard, 
“sufficient information exists with which to understand, evaluate, and 
build upon a prior work if a third party could replicate the results 
without any additional information from the author.”
43
 With the rise 
of empirical legal studies, including empirical studies of intellectual 
property, the replication standard has become relevant for a signifi-
cant subset of IP scholarship as well.  
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43. Id.  
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NORMS FOR IP SCHOLARSHIP 
With these considerations in mind, we urge legal scholars to 
adopt a set of professional ethical norms governing disclosure, trans-
parency, and conflicts of interest. These norms should serve to guide 
the conduct of academics and other researchers, as well as to establish 
benchmarks for future guidelines and standards. With these norms, we 
seek to promote three related objectives. The first is transparency: 
members of the academic community should disclose any monetary or 
related inducements that might have the potential to influence scholar-
ly research or create the perception that scholarly research has been 
unduly influenced. The second is to reduce the potential for overt or 
subconscious bias to affect scholarly research. Members of the aca-
demic community should seek wherever possible to minimize or elim-
inate outside influences that might inject bias or the appearance of 
bias into research. The third is to facilitate replicability and examina-
tion of existing work by requiring, to the fullest extent possible, the 
disclosure of the data underlying it.  
We thus offer the following suggested professional norms, which 
we hereby agree to adopt with respect to our own work. Similar norms 
have been widely adopted throughout the life sciences and social sci-
ences, in some cases by rule of the governing professional organiza-
tions or academic publishers. We believe that legal scholars should 
abide by norms that are at least as stringent with respect to transpar-
ency and avoiding bias. 
1. Research disclosure. We agree to disclose any sources of fund-
ing that contributed to the production of any given piece of research. 
We will disclose that funding source when the work is submitted for 
publication and on the work itself when the work is published or oth-
erwise made publicly available. Contribution includes both payment 
to the author for the production of a piece of research and money 
spent to cover the costs of research assistance, data acquisition, and 
the like.  
2. General personal disclosure. We agree to disclose prominent-
ly, either on our faculty websites or in an equivalent venue, all sources 
of funding we have received and all paid consulting or legal represen-
tation agreements we have made that are in any way relevant to our 
research or concern the same subject matter as our research. This in-
cludes an ongoing consulting relationship with a law firm or compa-
ny. Ongoing relationships include relationships where compensated 
work has been completed but there is an expectation of future com-
pensated work. This disclosure is required even if it does not directly 
impact, or involve the funding of, any particular research project. A 
general statement that a scholar receives money from various sources 
is not sufficient to satisfy this disclosure obligation. However, no dis-
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closure is required if the amount of money involved is less than $1000 
or if it constitutes only compensation for reasonable travel expenses. 
It is also not necessary to disclose personal equity holdings or owner-
ship stakes, although we note in our “Call for Action” that other insti-
tutions involved in legal academic governance may wish to explore 
this issue.  
We understand that in the course of legal practice or other types 
of consulting arrangements the fact of representation of a particular 
client may itself be confidential information for a time. The pledge is 
not designed to prevent such representation or bar such confidentiali-
ty. But the fact of representation should be disclosed as soon as the 
rules of practice permit, and if possible, the fact of representation 
should be disclosed even when the client cannot be. In addition, 
scholars should refrain from publishing academic work on the subject 
of the representation until such disclosure is feasible.
44
 
3. Institutional disclosure. We agree to disclose all sources of 
funding for any institute, center, conference, clinic, or other institution 
we direct or manage on that institution’s website. If there is more than 
one source of funding, we agree to indicate which of the sources of 
funding are major sources or represent a substantial share of the insti-
tution’s overall funding. 
4. No quid pro quo. We agree to refrain from engaging in any re-
search in which conclusions or outcomes are dictated by a third party 
in exchange for funding. This does not prevent the preparation of 
briefs, legal memos, or white papers on behalf of clients, but any such 
document should make clear that the author is acting as an advocate 
and not an academic in preparing that document. 
5. No prior approval. We agree to refrain from engaging in any 
research where a third party will have the right to approve or disap-
prove of the research before it is made public, except in order to pro-
tect the privacy or confidentiality of one or more individuals. 
6. Data disclosure and replication. Consistent with applicable 
rules governing human subjects protection, we agree to strive for rep-
licability of our published empirical research. Ideally, data needed to 
replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be made 
accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published. If the 
data set needed to replicate the results in a published paper cannot be 
                                                                                                                  
44. We intend for the phrase “on the subject of the representation” to be interpreted 
broadly. For instance, if a faculty member were currently employed by a client to represent 
the client in making an argument regarding patent validity under § 101 of the Patent Act, 
that faculty member should not publish academic work on any aspect of § 101 doctrine that 
is relevant to the case until the representation can be disclosed or until it has concluded. 
However, the faculty member would remain free to publish academic work on other aspects 
of patent law. 
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made available, but the database from which the data set was derived 
is accessible to other academic researchers, we agree to describe in 
detail how replication can be accomplished by these researchers. We 
further agree to disclose any other materials necessary to replicate 
research findings, including formulae and other algorithms. 
We consider the use of data accessible to other academics (facili-
tating replicability) to be a best practice that academics should engage 
in whenever possible. However, we realize that in some cases it may 
be impossible to obtain data without providing for nondisclosure be-
yond standard measures used to protect the identities of human sub-
jects. Accordingly, we do not believe it is a violation of ethical norms 
to publish a paper that relies on data that is unavailable to other aca-
demics and cannot be replicated, but that fact should be disclosed in 
the paper itself. 
7. Collegiality and open inquiry. We agree to remain open to ar-
guments on all sides and engage in discussion using language and 
logic appropriate to the highest ethical standards of academic dis-
course and inquiry. 
8. Dispersed institutional funding. We believe as an aspirational 
matter that it would be preferable if no center, institute, or program 
received a substantial share of its funding from a single source or 
from a multiplicity of sources whose preferences align on any signifi-
cant issue of law or policy. Rather, it would be preferable if institu-
tions received funding from a diversified group of sources whose 
preferences did not coincide, or at least from multiple sources with 
contrasting preferences. We recognize that this may be difficult or 
impossible for some institutions, particularly newer ones, and so we 
describe it as an aspirational goal rather than recommending that it be 
adopted immediately as a practical norm.  
As a general matter, all donors should be identified. We recognize 
that in certain circumstances, individual donors may wish to remain 
anonymous in order to keep the extent of their giving capacity private. 
The best practice would be to avoid this.  If that is impossible, anon-
ymous donations should never be used for any other reason, such as 
masking a donor’s interest in the topic or avoiding the potential impli-
cations for conflicts of interest. Corporate, foundation, and industry 
group donors should be identified under all circumstances.  
CALL FOR ACTION 
We consider this to be the beginning of a conversation and recog-
nize that, even with these general guidelines, there is much work to be 
done. We urge all institutions involved in legal academic govern-
ance — including the American Bar Association, American Associa-
tion of Law Schools, and others — to help develop and adopt these 
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and other ethical norms for the field. In particular, we urge those insti-
tutions to aid in the creation of more detailed guidelines that expand 
upon the principles we have enunciated here, as well as exploring ad-
ditional topics, such as personal equity holdings or ownership stakes. 
Conferences of academics, such as the Intellectual Property Scholars 
Conference or other groupings, could also be helpful in establishing 
careful governance processes so that our field can maintain and 
strengthen its formal ethical norms. 
 
 
John Allison 
University of Texas at Austin 
McCombs Graduate School of  
Business 
 
James Bessen 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Jeremy Bock  
University of Memphis Cecil C. 
Humphreys School of Law 
 
Robert A. Bohrer 
California Western School of 
Law 
 
Sarah Burstein 
The University of Oklaho-
ma College of Law 
 
Irene Calboli 
Texas A&M University School of  
Law 
 
Ralph D. Clifford 
University of Massachusetts 
School of Law 
 
Julian Cockbain 
Bioethics Institute Ghent 
 
Lauren Cohen 
Harvard Business School 
 
 
Jorge Contreras 
University of Utah S.J. Quinney 
College of  Law 
 
Ben Depoorter 
University of California, Has-
tings College of the Law 
 
Dieter Ernst 
East-West Center 
 
Robin Feldman 
University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law 
 
Brian Frye 
University of Kentucky College 
of Law 
 
Laura N. Gasaway 
University of North Carolina 
School of Law 
 
Shubha Ghosh 
University of Wisconsin Law 
School 
 
Ove Granstrand  
Chalmers University of  
Technology  
 
Marc Greenberg 
Golden Gate University School 
of Law 
 
No. 2] Open Letter on Ethical Norms in IP Scholarship 13 
 
 
James Grimmelmann 
University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law 
 
Umit Gurun 
University of Texas at Dallas  
 
Robert G. Harris  
University of California, Berke-
ley Haas School of Business  
 
Yaniv Heled  
Georgia State University Col-
lege of Law 
 
Laura Heymann 
William & Mary Law School 
 
Martin Husovec 
Tilberg Law School 
 
Ariel Katz 
University of Toronto Faculty of 
Law 
 
Scott Kominers 
Harvard Business School 
 
Sapna Kumar 
University of Houston Law Cen-
ter 
 
Mark A. Lemley 
Stanford Law School 
 
Trudo Lemmens 
University of Toronto Faculty of 
Law 
 
Dave Levine  
Elon University School of Law 
 
Yvette Joy Liebesman 
St. Louis University School of 
Law 
 
Phil Malone 
Stanford Law School 
 
Gregory Mandel 
Temple University Beasley 
School of Law 
 
Jonathan S. Masur 
University of Chicago Law 
School 
 
Keith E. Maskus  
University of Colorado, Boulder  
 
Mark McKenna 
Notre Dame Law School 
 
Joseph Scott Miller 
University of Georgia School of 
Law 
 
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette 
Stanford Law School 
 
Arti K. Rai 
Duke Law School 
 
Jason Rantanen 
University of Iowa College of 
Law 
 
Amelia Smith Rinehart  
University of Utah College of 
Law 
 
Jacob Rooksby 
Duquesne University School of 
Law 
 
Matthew Sag 
Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law 
14  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 29 
 
 
Sharon Sandeen 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
 
Joshua Sarnoff 
DePaul University College of 
Law 
 
Arul George Scaria 
National Law University, Delhi 
 
Brenda Simon 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law 
 
Jennifer Urban 
University of California, Berke-
ley School of Law 
 
Liza Vertinsky 
Emory University School of Law 
 
Andrea Wallace  
Ph.D. Candidate, University of 
Glasgow 
 
Jonathan Zittrain 
Harvard Law School
 
 
 
*The above-signed are not all drafters of this docu-
ment, but signal their support for these principles. 
Institutional names are for identification purposes 
only. 
